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5
Moral Mindfulness
Peggy DesAutels

Most of us view o urselves as having moral commitments and expect that
when given the opportunity, we will follow through on these commitments.
But our moral expectations may have little to do w ith how we actually behave. I explore in this chapter some explanations for our failures to follow
through and some possible solutions to bridge the gap between our moral
commitments and our behaviors. I draw on recent empirical studies and argue that social contextual cues and mindless mental habits play significant
roles in inhibiting real-time moral responsiveness. I conclude by identifying
mindful ways to recognize and resist such obstacles.

THE PROBLEM

There are many reasons w hy our day-to-day moral lives may fa il to reflect
our moral commitments. We may have selfish moments, we may quite consciously choose to override our moral commitments when we have other
priorities, or we may attempt to follow through on our moral commitments
but be incompetent at doing so. I am most interested, however, in situations
where our moral commitments app ly, we do not simply choose to ignore or
override tllese commitments, we are competent, and yet we still fail to follow tI1rough. Such situations often involve subtle social influences or unrecognized psychological habits that preve nt us from acting in ways that coincide with our own moral stands.
Ethical theorists and even moral psychologists have tended to be uninterested in tl1eori zing tlle conditions under which we do or do not follow
through on moral commitments or in theorizing how best to apply abstract
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ethical theories to concrete and particular lives. The assumption seems to be
that if we have committed to a patticular moral theory, we will, when possible, live our lives in accordance with that commitment. On those occasion
when ethicists do offer examples of applications, the situations to which
their theories are applied are usually hypothetical and described in a paragraph or less. Immanuel Kant, for example, offers four paragraph-length descriptions of scenarios to which the categorical imperative can be applied
0996b, 30-32). More recently, Lawrence Kohlberg (984), the Harvard psychologist who developed a Kantian-based theOlY of mora l development,
studied the moral reasoning of young boys using the "Heinz dilenuna"-a
paragraph describing a married man who must choose between tea ling a
life-saving drug and letting his wife die. But both Kohlberg and Kant leave
us wondering whether it is possible to commit to and successfully follow
through on a Kantian ethic in our actu al day-to-day lives. For example,
would the boys who reasoned through to a particular solution to tl1e Heinz
dilenuna have noticed if and w hen they were faced with a similar dilemma
in their actual lives? And if they had recognized the dilenuna, would they
have actually acted in the way that they hypotl1esized tl1ey would have
acted? Being able to reason morally about a paragraph of text may have
nothing to do witl1 how we perceive , reason about, and act in response to
the concrete situations we face in our day-to-day lives.l
In my own classes, when I ask students to reason about the Heinz
dilemma and to describe what they would do if they were in a similar situation, many of mem conclude that they would steal the drug. I then point out
to them, however, that almost no one actually resorts to tealing when they
or their loved ones are denied life-saving treatments. I also suggest mat
when push comes to shove, they probably would not themselves resort to
stealing. There wou ld, in all likelihood, remain too many social circumstances and habits of thought and behavior that would prevent tl1em from
doing so.
One group of ethical theorists, comprised of those who address moral internalism, does address whetl1er or not holding moral beliefs or making
moral judgments is necessa rily accompanied by the motivation to act OIl
tllOse beliefs and judgments. But most of tl1is work on internalism is can·
ceptual rather than empirical. 2 Even those moral internalists who have ar
empirical bent concern memselves primarily with whether or not having a
moral belief is correlated psychologically with having the motivation to aCi
on tl1at belief. They do not address psychological and social conditions un·
der which those who are motivated to act may still fail to follow tlu·ough.
Although few ethical theorists focus on how best to go about living au!
day-to-day lives so tl1at they reflect our moral conU11itments, some femini t:
have attempted to move past short simplified descriptions of hypothetical sit·
uations to better determine how both men and women actually reason abou
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and respond to concrete moral situations. Carol Gilligan (1982) followed
Kohlberg's example in her early research on developmental moral psychology, and compared the reasoning of young boys to young girls using short
descriptions of hypothetical dilemmas , but in later studies she interviewed
her subjects (both male and female) concerning examples of moral clilemmas they had faced or were currently facing in their own lives. This was certainly a step forward, but Gilligan's approach still tells us velY little about the
real-time processes subjects use when faced with a dilemma. How we reconstruct past situations or describe current situations in an interview setting
is often quite different from how we actually describe, reason, and behave
in real time. Our motivations and behaviors are seldom totally transparent to
us, and we are prone to fabricating "reasons" and "explanations" for our actions so that we will appear more "rational" or "moral" to ourselves and others than we actually are. More imponantly, however, such interview-based
approaches tell us nothing about moral attentiveness or missed moral opportunities. If we tend to be oblivious to moral demands or subtly influenced
by social contexts to ignore the needs of an other, studies like tl10se of Gilligan will fail to bring such moral failures to light. I maintain, then, tllat moral
responsiveness can only be assessed by examining relevant actual, real-time
practices.
Margaret Urban Walker makes a related point. In her book Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics (998), she advocates moving
past abstract, abbreviated theories of morality and moral behavior. Walker
presses for a view of morality "as something existing, however imperfectly,
in real human social spaces in real time , not something ideal or noumenal
in character" (18). Walker focuses her concerns on moral habits and practices and points out that what we notice about our own moral practices
may be quite different from what is actually occurring. One of our main
moral tasks, then, is making our previously unattended-to moral practices
and habits more transparent. She argues that what we need but do not yet
have is "an empirically saturated reflective analysis of what is going on in
actual moral orders" (11).
Walker and Gilligan, along with many other feminists, have enriched our
understanding of morality by emphasizing tlle SOcially embedded nature of
o ur moral identities, judgments, and practices; the need for examining critically actual moral behaviors and practices as they occur in richly detailed
concrete situations; and a call for transparency of our gendered understandings, social practices, and power-based relations. I hope to build on these insights by delving more deeply into just a few of the practices and habits tllat
mold our day-to-day moral behaviors.
As a start, let us assume that we as moral agents have made specific moral
commitments in our lives and intend to follow tllrough on them. For example, let us assume that we generally agree with and are even inspired to live
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our lives Cas I do and am) by Joa n Tronto's (1993) account of a n~c of
ca re. Tranto's ethic recognizes the imp ortance of moral responsiveness. "To
be a morally good person reql.1ires, among other things, that a per on strive '
to meet the demands of caring that present themselves in his or her life·'
(1 26). According to Tronto, there are fo ur key ele ments of care. They a:r
"caring about, noticing the need to care in the first place; taking care oj, a suming responsibility for ca re; care-giving, the actual work of ca re that
needs to be done; and care-receiving, the resp onse of that which is cared
for to the care" 026, emphasis added) . I focus here primarily o n the first element: "caring about" or the moral requirement to notice the need to care
in the first place.
Assuming that I have, indeed , committed to being attentive, what can I do
to ensure that I am as attentive as possible? Tron to never fully theorizes ho,,'
best to be attentive; she simply suggests the importance of passivity-of an
"emptying the mind" or a suspension of "one's own goals, ambitions, plan of life, and concerns"- as a way of being receptive to the needs of tho
around us (1993, 128). Tronto does not elabora te on what she means by pa sivity, but there is good evidence that moral attentiveness is not be t
achieved through an unreflective passivity or mental emptiness. Passivity allows for a susceptibility to the potentially biasing influ ence of others and to
critically unreflective habits of tho ught. I argue that moral attentiveness requires a certain nonpassive vigilance of tho ught where we attempt to
COunter known psychological tendencies and subtle social influences tllat
prevent us from seeing and resp onding to tlle demands of care . Even more
Importantly, moral attentiveness requires active structuring of our sodal enVIrOnments, habits, and practices in ways that facilitate seeing and respond1I1g to tlle moral features to which we are committed .
In what follows, I examine some of the mental processes and behavioral
practices that Contribute to the inhibition of moral resp onsiveness. I focus on
three, sometimes overlapping, factors that contribute to unintentional moral
unresponsiveness. I.first address how our p articular mind-sets could result in
OLi r being obliVious to tfiefact that a response i attedf01· anLlDrlefly surve}some o f the mind-sets that could result in moral oblivion. I then examine
ho::" sjtuational ambiguity could result in a sort of n"!Q.ral immgbjli.;y:and detail SOl
th
ays tllat situational ambigUity and subtle social fa ctors influ ence our real-time ~ness. I conclude my c Tscussion of inhibitors to moral responsiveness by addressing how sitUa tional and a d a}
pressures could influ ence us to ignore even unambiguo us moral demands.
The chapter ends with a sketch of possible strategies for resisting mindless
mental habits and morally immobilizing social cues tllat lead to moral unresponsiveness. I illustrate throughout that becoming a feminist who responds
to real-time moral de mands is, indeed , no simple task.
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M ORAL OBLIVION

One obviolls cause of moral unresponsiveness could be termed "moral
~ . " Io be morally oblivio us is to be completely or mostly un;ware of

a moral demand being made. We could be busily focused on a very specific
nonmoral task and fa il to no tice what is going on around us. We could be
lost in our own world w ith Our tho ughts inwardly focused. We could be following a well-esta blished routine or pattern of mental behavior and fail to
notice new input that does not fit the routine or pattern. The list is endless.
But the p oint here is that o ur minds are inescapably engaged in a variety of
ways througho ut the day. Even when we have committed o urselves to noticing and resp onding to very specific types of moral demands, the solution
cannot be to "emp ty o ur minds" simply because our lives require mental activity and attention. We would like to think that o ur evety day perceptions are
more o bjective and open-minded than they actually are. But the fact of the
matter is that what we notice and what we respond to in our lives varies
tremendously depending on o ur mental orientation and the context that induces this orientation. One result is that we are sometimes oblivio us to the
moral demands of o thers even t110ugh we do not intend to be and even
though in diffe rent mental and contextual circumstances we would not be.
In this section , I highlight just a few of the contributing factors to mo ral oblivio n: mindless routines, goal-directed foci, contextual cues, conceptual rigidity, and emotional filters.
One <;9ntributor to moral o blivion is our engagement in mindless routines.
Much of what we do is repetitive and automatic. As a result, we do not notice much of what is happening unless there is a problem. Ellen]. Langer, a
social psychologist, no tes that "a familiar structure or rhytl1m helps lead to
mental laziness, acting as a signal that there is no need to pay attention"
0989, 35). Mindless routines are likely to be fo und in family and work-based
contexts and are likely to take up large portions Of not all) of our days. For
instance, we could develop unnoticed habits of interaction with family
members in the context of o ur palticular family's daily routines that prevent
us from no tiCing many of their emotional and moral needs. As a result, even
the moral demands of those we love most may remain unnoticed and unattended to . In the workplace, patterns of sexual harassment may be so habitual that the harassers and perhaps even t110se being harassed may end up in
mindlessly perpetuating the behavioral patterns and remaining oblivio us to
the harms.
Focusing on a goal-directed task has a similar effect. If we are busily attempting to solve it' problem 01'- reach a goal, features in o ur environment of
relevance to the goal or p roblem are most salient to us and remaining features are" backgrounded. " As a result, we are likely to miss morally releva nt
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environmental cues. This becomes even more likely when we are time constrained . For example, if I am late for a meeting, I may hurriedly p ass by
someone who needs help witho ut even taking in that such help is needed.
A "Good Samaritan" study of theological students by ]. M. Darley and C. D.
Batson (1973) showed that when subjects were in a huny and passed by a
man lying in a dOOlway asking for help, only 10 percent of them stopped to
offer help. Whereas when the subjects were not in a hurry, 63 p ercent
stopped. Although the study did not examine in detail the mental states of
those who passed by, it may well be their hurried state contributed to a type
of oblivio n to the moral demand being made on them. It should be no surprise that when we are busy or stressed for time, we are more oblivio us to
moral features in our enviro nment.
Particular contexts also contribute to mo ral oblivio n .beca u~ntexts cue
expectetl e haviors and responses. As Langer points o ut, "we whisper in
hospitals and become anxious in a lice statio ns, sad in cemeteries, docile in
schools, and jovial at palties" (1989, 35) . Although she does no t directly address the moral implicatio ns of context-cued behaviors, such behavio ral expectations do indeed have Significant moral impact. If we are in a context
where we expect to experience certain types of behaviors (and do no t expect to experience certain other types of behaviors) both in ourselves and
otl1ers, we may completely miss mo rally relevant aspects of situatio ns in
those contexts. If we are in a work setting, fo r example, we are not exp ecting to see or respond to the personal suffe ring of colleagues and thus may
fail to notice the clear signs. Or if we are happily joking around at a p arty,
we may fail to notice the sexist implications of a jo ke just told o r that someone's feelings have been deeply hurt.
Conceptual and categorical rigidity also contribute to episodes of moral
oblivion 6y restricting either how we categorize a particular element witl1in
a situation _or how we organiZ.i! an entire perspective on a situatio n . Such
perceptual rigidity will often result in a failure ro see that "nonnroraJ" features
could be recategorized in morally relevant ways or that a situatio n could be
seen from an entirely different moral persp ective. As a simple example, we
can lock "pets" into one category, "livestock" into another, and "meat" into
yet another. Such rigid mind-sets allow us to remain o blivious to the moral
implications of eating meat--even whe n we are committed to being morally
responsive to the suffering of animals. An especially pernicio us p erceptual
inflexibility comes out of the deep prejudices and tl1e harmful stereotypes
that we hold. Feminists have long been aw are that stereotypes associated
with race, class, and gender can be so entrenched that we may be oblivious
to the needs of (and may even harm) many with whom we interact on a dayto-day basis.
.e-ar:lcl-efteQ(lre morally o blivious as a result of cel . emoFinally, we c
tional states. It is difficult to see moral featllres in our environment when these
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features are filtered by certain emotional states and disorders. We filter aspects
of our experience when we are angly, deeply depressed, anxious, elated,
bored, and so on. Luc Faucher and Christine Tappolet (2002), for example,
point to psychological research showing how fear results in "attentional biases." They suggest that "the emotion of fear, as experienced by normal subjects, involves an attentional bias towards threat stimuli" (12). Clearly, if being
in certain emotional states biases us toward celtain stimuli , these states could
well cause us to remain oblivious to other stimuli-stimuli that may be relevant to our moral commitments. Thus, our emotional states are just one more
potential cause for our being morally oblivious and thus umesponsive.3
It is important to mention that not all oblivious states involve a complete
lack of awareness-there can be degrees of oblivion. For example, we can
be morally oblivious even when we are somewhat aware of a morally relevant feature but fail fully to attend to that feature. It is almost as if a feature
of our environment remains solely in our moral peripheral vision and never
enters our morally focused gaze. A good example of moral oblivion resulting from noticing and yet failing fully to attend to a morally relevant feature
was described to me by a friend of mine . He was waiting to cross at a
crowded city intersection thinking his own thoughts and only vaguely noticed an elderly woman tottering unevenly toward the same intersection. Although he considers himself to be the type of person who helps those in
need, he did not fully attend to the fact that this particular woman needed
assistance at this particular intersection. It was only when someone else offered assistance that he mentally kicked himself-of course she needed assistance, and he should have offered it! Awareness of sexual harassment can
also come in degrees. For example, a female employee may be somewhat
aware that she is uncomfortable by celtain behaviors of her male colleagues
and even be somewhat aware that other female employees are similarly uncomfortable, but she may never fully attend to her own and others' discomfort and thus may never directly respond even when in a position to do
So, we can have moral commitments, we can even be committed to
morally responsive in ou r day-to-day lives, but we can fail to follow throu
on o ur commitments simply because we remain morally oblivious to
own and others' needs-because our minds are othelwise organ ized
engaged. One way to avoid moral oblivion is to resist habituated,
patterns of tho ught and behavior-to live more flexibly and "mindfully"
as individuals and as groups of individuals.

SOCIAL INFLUENCE
In some situations where we unintentionally fail to follow through, it is
that we are simply oblivious. Instead, we are aware that a situation might
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for a moral response from us, but we are unsure, and in the end-w.ek not
respond. Because we are social creatures, we can easily be swayed, often
L1ncarrSclously, by those around us to resolve our uncertainty in a way that
counters our ostensible moral commitments. A number of significant studies
in social psychology help me to make this point and are nicely summarized
in Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbitt's The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology (1991) .
There are three especially salient ways that our moral responsiveness
could be influenced by social context. Imagine that we are in a group situation where the group witnesses a woman being harmed. We are capable of
coming to her aid , 1 ut we do not. One possibility for our inaction could be
that we assume that someone else in the cro~d will respond. We take no resp onsib.i1iJ:¥-ferresponding, even though we fully recognize that somebody
should respond. A velY different possibility for why we fail to respond could
be that the situation is ambiguous (e.g. , it is at least somewhat unci'ear to us
thar-a~ actua11y being lurt , so we subconsciously rely on others to
interRr t the situation for us. Because no one else responds, we assume dlat
we have misread the situation and there is no need for anyone to respond.
And a third possibility is that we correctly interpret p~~_wha 's happenmg (e.g., that a woman is being severely beaten and needs immediate
h; lp), but we do not act because we feel social press.ure...to conform outwardly to the interpretations, attitudes, and inactions of tl1..o se around us. I
expand on each of these possibilities below.
One of the more Significant social influences of relevance to moral followthrough is referred to by social psychologists as "inhibition of bystander intervention." Most of us have probably heard of at least some of the studies
that show that the presence of others tends to dilute or diffuse the responsibility felt by potential altrui ts . In the 1960s, John Darley and Bibb Latane,
both situationa l psychologists, noticed and theorized about a series of attacks on women in which no one responded to the victims' evident distress.
Perhaps the most famous (or should I say "infamous"?) bystander inaction
case involved Kitty Genovese:
Over a 30-minute period in Kew Gardens, a middle-class section of Queens,
New York, a woman named Kitty Genovese was stabbed repeatedly by an assa ilant. Though she shouted for help continually during that time, anc! despite
the fact (as police later were able to establish) that at least 38 people heard her
and were aware of the incident, no one intervened in any way. No one even
called the police! (Ross and Nisbett 1991, 41)

Although media commentary at the time tended to attribute the inaction of
onlookers to an ever-increaSing alienation and indifference of inhabitants of
large cities, Darley and Latane concluded from their own studies tllat ituationa I factors are much more significant than the supposed worsening character traits of city dwellers.
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In one study conducted by Latane and Darley at Columbia University, students in various configurations were asked to complete questionnaires in a
room that slowly filled up with smoke. The subjects were either by themselves, with two o ther naive subjects, or with two confederates who had
been instructed to ig nore the smoke. Seventy-five percent of the students
who were left a lone intervened by exiting the room to repolt the smoke;
only 38 percent of ti10se w ho were with two o ti1er naive students intervened;
and onJy 10 percent of tilOse working alo ngside the two impassive confederates left to intervene eRo s and Nisbett 1991, 41).
In another study by Latane and Rodin , while subjects were filling o ut a
questionna ire, they could hear what sounded like the fema le experimenter taking a bad spill on the other side of a room divider. Subjects
were e ither a lo ne, w ith two other naive subjects, or with one unperturbed
confed e rate . The res ults were strikingly similar to the study just described.
Seventy p ercent of solitary subjects intervened, whereas only 40 percent
-of those sitting with o ther na ive subjects intervened, and o nly 7 percent of
those with impassive con federates got up to offer assistance (Ross and
Nisbett 1991, 42).
These two studies, and others like them, suggest ti1at tilose around us have
a significant impact on how we interpret and respond to ambiguous situations. Even when we are committed to alleviating the suffering of those we
encounter, we may still fail to do so. We don't intend to be unresponsive, but
we fail to respond, nonetheless, e ither because responsibility is diffused or
because we are socially influenced to reperceive the situation.
One aspect of the two studies just lescribed is that the situ ations were
somewhat ambig uo us; it wasn 't necessarily clear to the subjects in the study
exactly what was going o n. Perhaps the smoke was harmless, or perhaps tile
woman behind the partition was fine. When situa tio ns are at least somewhat
ambiguous, it may be tilat w have more of a tendency to ignore o ur initial
reaction and to rely solely on social context. But studies conducted by
Solomon Asch in tile 1950s show even more conVincingly, I think, how susceptible we all are to social context even in unambiguous situations. Asch's
work demonstrates that reports of even o ur most direct visual perceptions
can be socially influ enced.
In one of Asch's stud ies, a naive subject was placed in a room witi1 six to
eight confederates. Over a sequ nce of trials, the subject was asked to compare a "standard" line with three "comparison" lines and then say which
comparison line was tile same le ngth as the standar I line . In each trial, the
confederates were asked in turn to supply their answer. Finally, the naive
subject who had been instructed to consult witil no one, answered last. During the first few trials, tile subjects found the task easy, as all of ti1e confederates supplied the o bviously correct answer prior to tile subjects' being
asked to report the ir judgments. On ti1e fourth trial, however, all of tile confederates confidently, and with no heSitation , supplied the same obv io Lisly
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wrong answer-judging that the 0.5 inch comparison line was dle same
lengdl as dle 1. 5 inch standard line.
Ross and Nisbett describe what would usually happen when the first confederate voiced a wrong answer, "Inevitably, the su bject's reaction was one
of wide-eyed disbelief, a quick double check to make celtain that dle judge's
response was as off-base as it seemed, and often a nelVOUS giggle or some
other expression of vicarious discomfort at his peer's folly" 0991, 30). As
more confederates followed suit, however, the subject's "feelings of disbelief
and discomfort . . . were . . . greatly heightened and [took] on a different
quality" (30). When it was finally the subjects' turn to answer, dley were .in
effect asked either to conform to the unanimous, apparendy certain, majority or to remain independent and stick to the convictions of their own perceptions. Each subject participated in five to twelve conformity trials embedded within ten to eighteen trials total. Even Asch, who expected the re
would be few who conformed, was taken by surprise. Depending on ilie
particular study, 50 percent to 80 percent of the subjects conformed to dle
majority's judgment at least once. Overall , the subjects conformed a third of
the time (30-31) .
Certainly, one could be heartened by the fact that two-thirds of the time,
conformity did not Occur. But it is also very telling how many conformed
even in situations containing very unambiguous visual evidence. It is also
noteworthy that Asch himself did not take the stance that dle conforming
subjects reperceived or reinterpreted the visual data . Rather, he concluded
that either conformers assumed that their private percep tions must someh ow
be wrong or they assumed that their private perceptions were in fact correct
but were unwilling to dissent from the majority.
What then do these various studies contribute to o ur understanding of
moral responsiveness? They celtainly point to ways that o ur resp onsiveness
Of unresponsiveness can be influenced by those around us and dlat we can
often be unaware of the role such social influence plays. These are not examples of ovelt coercion by od1ers. In fact, in nonexperimental situations involving bystanders, for example, those around us do not intend to influ ence
even subtly ou r judgments and behaviors. And yet we are being influenced
often profoundly and in a number of possible ways. The only way to counter
such influence would, at the very least, involve a mindful awaren.~f dlese
types ~a.
_______

MORAL MINDFULNESS
Unintended failures to follow through on our moral commitments are not
rare occurrences. Many, if not most, of our real-time perceptions of situations
that call for a moral response are indeed biased by our current mind-sets and
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our social situa tedness. We can be morally biased or oblivious when we are
mindlessly engaged in routines, stuck in categories, oriented toward single
perspectives, or influenced by social contexts. When at the workplace, we
are influenced by work-related mind-sets and our colleagues. When at social
gatherings, we are influenced by party-related mind-sets and our fellow
partiers. When at home, we are influenced by home-related mind-sets and
our loved ones. And , when confronted by the needs of strangers, we are influ enced by those around us confronted by those same strangers. In fact, we
are almost never passively "open-minded" and "alone " in our judgments or
in our responsiveness.
Because we tend to underestimate how prone we are to mindless habits
and social influences, we tend to overestimate that we will, in fact, interpret
and respond to situations in ways that best follow through on our moral commitment to care. More work celtainly needs to be done on how best to overcome such biases, but celtainly the first step must be to recognize that we are
all subject to such influences and to make a concerted effort to resist passive
mental patterns and the known effects of groups when confronted by a situation calling for a caring response. In some cases, we should trust our first itnpulses moce, even when those around us do not see what we see. This, too,
has been an insight of feminist edlics. Diana Tietjens Meyers convincingly argues for the importance of heterodox moral perception--of seeing "social life
in ways that challenge established cultural values and norms" and of seeing
"suffering or harm dlat odlers do not notice" (1995a, 2). We can only see and
act on dle suffering d1at odlers do not notice when we successfully resist psychological tendencies eidler to lock into single p erspectives or to conform.
There are, as I see it, two main avenues for resisting. One is simply to attempt
to improve our own individual psychologies. The odler is to attempt to improve the Social contexts wid1inwhich our psychologies are embedded.
Improving our individual capacities for moral follow-through involves improving our moral perceptual habits and skills. It involves consciously and
mindfully attempting to be a better moral responder. We must view ourselves
as moral perceivers and commit to see ing and responding to moral saliencies that we tend to miss. One way to do this is to conSCiously attempt to see
even the most mundane situations from new perspectives. We can also try to
"fine-tune " our perceptions in order better to pick up on suffeljng in others.
J."erhap~ most importantly, we ca n choose daily tasks and projects that best
"tram up" our desired moral perceptua l capacities. Simply desiring to be better moral responders will nor necessarily make us better responders. If we
specificall y wish to develop more real-time sensitivity to dle feelings and
n eeds of others, we should not choose to live our lives or to embark on careers in which we are literally removed from others or required to treat othe rs coldly and impartially. We must mindfully place ourselves in day-to-day
situations dlat give us chances to practice and improve.
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Although there are steps that we as individual agents can take to resist
mindless practices that prevent moral follow-through, I do not mean to in~
sinuate that we can or should become socially isolated autonomous agents
resisting the influence of others at every turn. We are inescapably social creatures, and as such must work together to improve our moral judgments and
practices. Our most effective moral strategies involve improving the social
situations and institutions within which we find ourselves. Families, workplaces, neighborhoods, and so on can and should be set up in ways that encourage seeing and addressing harms. For instance, if, in the studies described earlier, there had been clear "policies" given to study participants
prior to their palticipating that included reporting any smoke coming
through vents or investigating all cases where someone might have fallen,
participants would have been much more likely to do so. In fact, a number
of studies in social psychology show that providing a clearly defined, institutionally endorsed "channel" for addreSSing moral concerns greatly increases the chances that individuals will act on their concerns (Ross and Nisbett 1991, 46-58).
In such institutional settings as hospitals, for example, there should be
well-documented and well-publicized policies and procedures for reporting
and addressing ethical concerns. These concerns could be about a particular
individual (e.g., an incompetent health-care professional) or about specific
practices Or policies that increase the risk of harm (e.g. , institutional practices
and procedures that result in increased risk for medical error or that discriminate by sex, race, or class). One good start for any institution is a wellpublictzed whistle-blowing policy with clearly alticulated steps for how to
proceed with an ethical concern accompanied by clear protections for those
who initiate the whistle-blowing process. Hospitals that fail to encourage
nurses to come forward, for example, or that fail to protect nurses from
physiCian retribution when they do come fOlward are institutions tl1at, in effect, severely inhibit moral responsiveness.
Communities, both large and small, can also develop strategies to encourage moral attentiveness and responsiveness. Neighbors can strategize how
best to look out for each other and can develop clear "chalmels" both for r _
questing help (e.g., phone calls, emergency whistles, or alarms) and responding to potential tlu'eats (e.g., checking in or calling 911). Family members can work together on developing better communication skills and on
aVOiding mental and behavioral ruts. Community leaders and parents can
work to be good examples and can encourage moral responsiveness in
those tl1ey lead and parent.
Finally, as part of o ur edu cation process, we can train ou rs Ives and our
students to se unnoticed moral harms and provide concrete ways to address such harms. Through various sorts of ducational experiences, we can
jar ourselves and our students out of moral oblivion and mindless ap-
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proaches to life-prov id ing new perspectives, categories, and insights that
help us and them to see and respo nd in new ways. This is precisely w hat
already-existing fields of study in feminist, race, and class theory can and
should do .

NOTES
I am grateful to Margaret Urban Walker, Robert C. Richardson, Ja mes Lindemann Nelson, and Paul Benson for providing comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
1. For more on moral perception, see DesAutels (1996, 1998).
2. For more on internalism and its surrounding deba tes, see James Lindemann Nelson, chapter 6, in this volume .
3. A nu mber of emotio nal disorders and occurrent e motional states are corre lated
w ith what cognitive psychologists refer to as "attentional biases." Such biases result
in selectively attending to celtain emotion-relevant features within o ne's situation at
the expense of attending to other features. For example, see Mogg and Bradley
(1999) .
4. For a compelling examp le of a woman's being awa re and yet not fully aware of
sexual harassment in her own workplace, see Conley's autobiographical account in
Wa lking Out on the Boys (1998). It was only well into her career as a professor of
neurosurgelY at Stanford University that sexual harassment within her own experience and her own medica l school became fu lly salient to he r, and thus only then that
she attempted to address the harassment.

